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 Abstract  
This study aims to understand the relationship between the quality of 
public administration and the rate of profitable enterprises by locality 
in Vietnam in the period 2015 - 2019. With a combined data set from 
two sources including The first is the Provincial Competitiveness Index 
(PCI) dataset jointly implemented by the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (VCCI) with the support of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) in Vietnam, the second 
is the "White Book of Vietnamese Enterprises" compiled and published 
annually by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. Combined with 
panel data estimation method to assess the impact of public 
administration quality indicators on the rate of profitable enterprises by 
locality. Research results show that there exists a relationship between 
the quality of public administration and the rate of profitable 
enterprises. Especially the indicators of Entry Costs, Policy Bias, and 
Labor and Training have both positive and negative effects with very 
strong statistical significance. 
Introduction 
Economist Douglas North (North, 1989) has emphasized in his thesis that institutions are an 
essential factor explaining changes in economic growth across countries. Research by North 
shows that property rights are protected and stable is a critical factor for the economic 
development of nations. Following him, in a microscopic approach, the gradual institutional 
change is due to political and economic organizations realizing that they can do better by 
somehow altering the existing institutional framework. If political and economic markets are 
efficient, meaning there are no transaction costs, then all options will always work. But agents 
always have to act on incomplete information; their choices are not always practical. 
Transaction costs in economic and political markets represent inefficient property rights. 
Similar to Acs et al. (2018) also stated that:  “Particularly important for economic growth are 
economic institutions in society such as the structure of property rights and the presence of 
market frameworks. efficient field”. In addition, without property rights, businesses would not 
have an incentive to invest in physical capital or human resources or apply more effective 
technologies to improve their business performance.  However, these studies are still limited 
in terms of causality between economic institutions and economic efficiency (Chu Thi, 2018). 
Based on the role of economic institutions in the efficiency of the overall economy, there have 
been many related studies to examine the impact of economic institutions on enterprises. A 
number of studies by domestic researchers have emphasized the crucial role of institutions in 
the effectiveness of business activities. According to Bach Ngoc (2017), different quality of 
provincial governance institutions will lead to significant differences in the impact on the entry 
and growth of enterprises, in which aspects of transparency, property rights, and contract 
enforcement have a positive impact on business performance. Besides, the studies of Nguyen 
et al. (2013); Viet (2013) also show that increasing transparency and reducing formal costs in 
the quality of public administration have a positive impact on the performance of enterprises, 
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increasing transparency and reducing formal costs in public administration. Most studies focus 
on the impact of public administration on the performance of each enterprise, ignoring the 
overall performance of enterprises operating in each locality, expressed based on the ratio of 
locally profitable businesses. To fill this gap, the study was conducted to provide a new 
perspective on the impact of public administration quality on the proportion of profitable 
enterprises in different localities of Vietnam.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we synthesize the 
theoretical background and develop hypotheses for the research. In section 3, we provide 
information about the research data and methodology. We present the research results in 
section 4 and the discussion in section 5. The final section is the conclusion 
Literature Review 
Theory of quality of public administration for enterprises 
The institution is defined as a set of rules that limit human behavior (North, 1990) and as a tool 
to coordinate millions of people in a certain order. "The meaning of institutions is man-made 
in terms of political structure, economic and social interactions" (North, 1990). This shows that 
the nature of public administration is self-constructed by people to solve practical problems in 
the operation of the state, so the theories of state management are heavily reformed. and 
pragmatic (Rabin et al., 2006). Running a country will force public administration managers to 
solve many problems in many different fields, so according to (Frederickson et al., 2003), there 
is no reason why any particular theory can be applied to public administration. Because this is 
a field that is both interdisciplinary and highly practical, a single theory can't describe, explain 
or account for the complexity of this field. Therefore, this explains the significant impact of 
public administration on all sectors, including the economy in general and businesses in 
particular. 
Based on the role of institutions/public administration in the economy, scholars worldwide 
have come up with the idea of investigating the relationship of public administration to 
businesses. According to the study of Hoskisson et al. (2000), the role of institutions in the 
economy is to reduce transaction and information costs through reducing uncertainty and 
establishing a stable institutional structure to facilitate the guarantee of property rights, thereby 
creating an excellent environment to stimulate the interaction between actors in the economy. 
In addition, a study by World Bank (2002) concluded that in a country with better institutional 
quality, the risks arising from transactions will be managed effectively and thereby improve 
the quality of the business environment in the country, promote the business performance of 
enterprises, and the ability to generate higher profits. Thus, the role of institutions in the 
economy is to focus on creating a better business environment for businesses, stimulating the 
entry of new firms into the market. Besides, economists who study the impact of institutions 
on companies based on the view of transaction costs also have similar comments. Transaction 
costs here are seen as corresponding to corruption and lack of transparency related to the 
operational functions of the public administration (Mcculloch et al., 2013). According to the 
study of Coase (1937), the economy under an institution has a framework to reduce randomness 
in business transactions. Clear and low transaction costs help to create a good environment. 
Since then, businesses will tend to invest more long-term and focus on improving creativity. 
And vice versa, when the institutional environment is poor with high transaction costs, implicit 
and not transparent (providing information, bribery, unofficial costs), it will make businesses 
more inclined to short-term investment direction or no investment. Most empirical studies tend 
to support the view that the quality of economic institutions will have a proportional effect on 
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economic growth through increased corporate productivity and increased demand as 
companies are more likely to invest in new jobs in research on the influence of better 
government institutions on the performance of 16,105 enterprises in more than 42 developing 
and transition countries. This means that organizations have a real influence on the aggregate 
performance of the economy through a small but cumulative impact on businesses. Along with 
that, a study by Jibir et al. (2019) examines the role of government organizations in promoting 
the activities of companies in 23 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This study has shown that 
organizations have a significant and positive contribution to the performance of companies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, this research has shown that controlling corruption, effective 
government, quality regulation, and the rule of law are pro-market institutions that effectively 
create favorable business and investment environments.  
In Vietnam, since the implementation of the "Doi Moi" policy of transforming from a centrally 
planned economy to a socialist-oriented market economy, over the past ten years, researchers 
have also begun to pay attention to the relationship between the impact of institutions and 
businesses. The first is a study by Hansen et al. (2009) with data using three enterprise surveys 
conducted in 1992, 1997, and 2002 to analyze whether direct government support in 
entrepreneurship and other forms of interaction with the public sector affect the long-term 
performance of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam. And 
the analysis demonstrated that initial government support for firms is a statistically significant 
determinant of firm growth, and this occurs even when controlling for relationships with the 
state. More recently, Chu Thi (2018) has studied the role of economic institutions in the 
operation of enterprises of all fields, locations, sizes, and types of enterprises. Specifically, the 
study will compare the impact of institutions on the performance of enterprises in a continuous 
period of 9 years (2006-2014) by combining two data sets, including Enterprise Survey (GES) 
conducted by the General Statistics Office and the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) 
Dataset of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry. As a result, economic institutions 
play an important role in the well-being of an economy in general and in investment decisions 
and business performance in particular. Another study is based on a transaction cost perspective 
to assess the impact of local governance on firm performance. The study analyzes more than 
300,000 SMEs in Vietnam combined with the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) dataset 
for the period 2006-2012, showing that local governance with high quality will have a positive 
effect on the revenue growth of local small and medium enterprises (Nguyen HTT et al., 2018). 
Aspects of provincial governance institutions differ significantly in their impact on the entry 
and growth of private enterprises, aspects of transparency, and protection of assets. Private 
equity and contract enforcement will have a positive correlation to the development of the 
private business sector, the conclusion of the study (Bach Ngoc, 2017). 
The relationship between public administration and corporate profits 
According to Tran (2019), the studies on corporate efficiency and profitability in conventional 
economic have eliminated institutional factors. But in practice, corporate efficiency and 
profitability can be impacted or disrupted by government regulations or distorted by local 
institutional quality. In particular, this is even stronger for businesses transitioning from a 
planned economy to a market economy, such as Vietnam. Institutional factors can increase or 
decrease agency costs between economic actors. Therefore, it is crucial to consider the impact 
of institutional factors when looking at the performance and profitability of firms across 
industries. Similarly, the study of Cherchye and Verriest (2016) also states that the political 
environment and legal strength affect the profitability of enterprises. In addition, they also find 
that the institution partially affects the profitability of enterprises through increased 
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easier, which will help increase the entry of new businesses and put pressure on the market. 
Competition in businesses leads to a negative impact on business profits. Looking at them, the 
above influencing factors all represent the quality of the institution. Using a large number of 
SMEs operating in 25 European countries between 2006 and 2014, Gaganis et al. (2019) 
concluded that freedom from business, stabilizing political and institutional indicators 
positively affect the profitability of small businesses and medium enterprises in Europe. This 
research has broadened our understanding of the factors that drive corporate profitability. 
Similarly, in another study that examined how institutional changes in 16 transition economies 
in Central and Eastern Europe with more than 230,000 observations affect firm profits, the 
empirical results show that Institutional development can increase transparency and reduce risk 
and transaction costs. Still, it also makes competition stronger and makes it harder to maintain 
the same level of profitability. Besides, the study also contributes to the theory that the reform 
of institutions to improve the quality of institutions will help domestic enterprises have more 
advantages and thereby increase profits. Still, it has negative effects on the profitability of 
multinational enterprises with branches here (Kafouros & Aliyev, 2016). This can show 
whether the quality of institutions that create a fair competition environment will affect the 
profitability of businesses. A study in Vietnam has shown that when the quality of the 
provincial institutional environment is improved, the profitability of enterprises will increase, 
using the data of listed companies from 2007 to 2015 in Vietnam (Ha et al., 2019). 
Hypothesis Development 
In general, the impact of the quality of public administration on the performance and 
profitability of enterprises is specific. From many studies by scholars around the world, as well 
as scholars in Vietnam, results are showing that the quality of public administration in general 
or its representative factors in particular such as control corruption, the quality of law and 
politics, transaction costs, or other asset protection rights all have a certain impact on firm 
performance (Mcculloch et al., 2013; Smith, 2007; Chu Thi, 2018). From that, we can see that 
the operation process of an enterprise is affected by the quality of public administration, and 
the profit as a result of the operation process is no exception. A few recent studies have 
confirmed the relationship between the quality of public administration and corporate profits, 
both positively and negatively (Kafouros & Aliyev, 2016; Gaganis et al., 2019; Ha et al., 2019). 
Therefore, combining these two theoretical bases, the author proposes to develop a further 
research hypothesis to examine the relationship between the quality of public administration 
and the rate of profitable enterprises by locality in Vietnam. By using unique independent 
variables of Vietnamese public administration quality. The following hypotheses were 
developed: 
H1: Entry Costs positively affect local profitability 
H2: Land Access and Security of Tenure positively affect the rate of profitable enterprises by 
locality 
H3: Transparency and Access to Information positively affect local profitability 
H4: Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance negatively affect profitability by locality 
H5: Informal Charges negatively affect local profitability 
H6: Policy Bias positively affect local profitability 
H7: Proactivity of Provincial Leadership positively affect the rate of profitable enterprises by 
locality 
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H9: Labor and Training positively affect the rate of profitable enterprises by locality 
H10: Legal Institutions positively affect the rate of profitable enterprises by locality 
Methods 
Data 
This study uses panel data with a sample size of 315 observations covering 63 provinces in 
Vietnam for the five years from 2015 to 2019, and this is a balanced panel. Information from 
the control data table is collected from two primary data sources. The first source is the 
Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) dataset developed jointly by the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (VCCI) with the support of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in Viet Nam.  
The data set is built by collecting and surveying enterprises in all provinces and cities 
nationwide, taking place annually on the largest scale. It is possible to find out and explain why 
some provinces and cities have developed ahead of other provinces and cities in terms of the 
private economy, job creation, and economic growth. In addition, this is also a helpful reference 
source for local leaders and policymakers who can identify inadequacies in economic policy 
management and a premise for economic policy, select the most effective solutions (VCCI, 
2020). The PCI index was launched in 2005, collected, and surveyed in 42 provinces and cities 
of Vietnam with eight sub-indices. Up to now, the most recent methodological update in 2017, 
data has been collected in all 63 cities with ten sub-indices built from 128 criteria including: 
Entry Costs is built to measure and evaluate the difference in market entry costs of newly 
established enterprises between provinces. Land Access and Security of Tenure is just a 
measure of two aspects of the land problem that all businesses face. Transparency and Access 
to Information measure the accessibility of provincial plans and legal documents required for 
business operations. Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance is a measure of the amount of 
time an enterprise has to spend to carry out administrative procedures. Informal Charges are 
measures of the informal costs a business has to pay and the impediments these informal costs 
cause to its business. Policy Bias is used to assessing private enterprises' competitive 
environment among the incentives for state-owned enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises. 
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership is a measure of the creativity and wisdom of provincial 
leaders in the process of implementing policies. Business Support Services is used to measure 
the province's services for private sector development. Labor and Training is a measure of local 
leadership efforts to promote vocational training and skills development in support of local 
industries. Legal Institution is a measure of the trust of private enterprises in the local judicial 
and judicial system. 
The second data set is an index of the percentage of profitable businesses by locality. This data 
is taken from the "White Paper on Vietnamese Enterprises" compiled and published by the 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam every year. This data set was created to meet the 
requirements of managers, research, and use the information for business development goals 
nationwide and locally. The "Vietnamese Enterprise White Paper" content released firstly in 
2019 includes essential information to assess the level of business development in the country 
and localities in the 2016-2018 period. 
This study applies descriptive statistics to the data of provinces and cities to provide detailed 
information on local public administrative characteristics and changes in the profit proportion 
of enterprises. Profitable business over time estimated using Stata15 software. The panel data 





ISSN 2721-0960 (Print), ISSN 2721-0847 (online) 
Copyright © 2021, Journal La Sociale, Under the license CC BY-SA 4.0  
the period 2015 – 2019. The simplest type of model for panel data is the synthetic OLS model, 
which takes the form of an equation: 
To quantify the spatial interaction between metropolis and provinces, this study relies a 
modified gravity model because of the similarity between the interaction strength and universal 
gravitation rules (Yang, 1989). This model was first used in economics by Reilly (1931) then 
Zipf (1942) adopted the gravitation model to city-system spatial-interaction analysis. After that, 
the gravitation model has been widely adopted by researchers measuring bilateral relations. 
The basic model of gravitation is: 
𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡    (1)                    (1) 
Where: Pfit is the ratio of profitable enterprises in total enterprises in provinces/ 
cities iϵ(1; 63) in the year tϵ(2015; 2019) . β0 is the intercept factor. X  is the matrix of 
independent variables described in Table 1. β is a vector of estimated regression coefficients. μ 
is a random term with a mean of 0. In this model, the coefficients are estimated by the OLS 
model with a sample of 615 (i*t) observations. This model assumes similarity and no 
correlation between the observed variables of province i over different time points or between 
different provinces in the same period. Therefore, this is the most limited panel data model and 
the least used in the research literature because each province will have different public 
administration characteristics that may or may not affect the independent variables. Therefore, 
to overcome this limitation, two other panel data models that can handle individual effects are 
also used: the fixed effect model and the random effect model (Oscar, 2010; Hausman, 1978). 
Equation (2) describes the Fixed Effects Model: 
𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡   (2)  
Where: αi (i = 1,2, … ,63)is an unknown intercept for each province (63 specific intercepts for 
each province). The fixed-effect model controls the effects of provincial public administration 
characteristics on the independent variables by fixing these features in the intercept. This means 
that the characteristics of public administration for provinces may vary, but for each province 
will not change over time. In contrast, unlike the fixed-effects model, the inter-provincial 
variation in the random-effects model is assumed to be random and does not correlate with the 
independent variables included in the model. Equation (3) shows the random-effects model. 
𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜔𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡  (3) 
Where: α is a constant random term, ωi  is a random error term with mean equal to 0 and 
variance equal to σω
2  . In order to select the appropriate model among the above three models, 
this study has carried out a number of tests. Hausman test is performed to decide whether to 
choose a suitable model between two fixed or random-effects models. Besides, the Wald test 
is also used to test for heteroskedasticity, and Wooldridge test is also used to test the 
phenomenon of autocorrelation. The above two tests are used to detect the defects of the data 
table. If the data has defects, then it will be overcome by the FGLS method. 
Table 1. Explanation of notation for variables 
 Variable Description of variables 
Dependent variable   
Pf Percentage of profitable businesses by location 
Independent variables   
CSPT1 Entry Costs 
CSPT2 Land Access and Security of Tenure 





ISSN 2721-0960 (Print), ISSN 2721-0847 (online) 
Copyright © 2021, Journal La Sociale, Under the license CC BY-SA 4.0  
CSPT4 Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance 
CSPT5 Informal Charges 
CSPT6 Policy Bias 
CSPT7 Proactivity of Provincial Leadership 
CSPT8 Business Support Services 
CSPT9 Labor and Training 
CSPT10 Legal Institutions 
Results and Discussion 
Data Descriptive Statistics 
The statistical description of the variables that can be considered in Table 2 shows that the 
Entry Costs (CSTP1) value is ranked the highest among the other independent variables, 
reaching an average value of 7.88 points and having a range from 5.86 to 9.28 points. Next in 
second place is Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance (CSPT4), with an average t-score of 
6.70 points, ranging from 4.82 to 8.90 points. In contrast, the Score for Policy Bias (CSTP6) 
and Proactivity of Provincial Leadership (CSTP7) can be seen as the two most underrated 
indicators by the business community, with only average scores of 5.45 and 5.43 points, 
respectively. The core value of the variable Policy Bias (CSTP6) runs between 3.11 and 8.01 
points, Proactivity of Provincial Leadership (CSPT7) range from 3.31 to 8.37 points. In general, 
the average value of the remaining independent variables fluctuates at a good average score 
from 5.99 points to 6.31 points. And most scores ranged from 3 points to more than 8 points. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dv. Min Max 
CSTP1 315 7.884995 0.6876399 5.861438 9.283225 
CSTP2 315 6.313295 0.7146283 4.122625 7.894723 
CSTP3 315 6.308559 0.4558385 4.883858 7.436815 
CSTP4 315 6.708538 0.7801318 4.825339 8.901896 
CSTP5 315 5.614806 0.8760428 3.340238 8.289467 
CSTP6 315 5.451371 0.9682771 3.115119 8.013603 
CSTP7 315 5.434793 0.9095768 3.318937 8.371367 
CSTP8 315 6.048451 0.7082977 4.175933 7.81509 
CSTP9 315 6.240349 0.8115361 4.141435 8.237934 
CSTP10 315 5.99674 0.7897047 3.857325 7.986376 
Pf 315 0.5784127 0.1213899 0.347 0.975 
Source: Author’s calculate 
Figure 1 shows four indicators representing the quality of public administration across 63 
provinces in Vietnam, with two having the highest mean score and two having the lowest. The 
indicators are scaled from 1 to 10 where higher values represent better public administration 
quality. In general, the indicators have significant changes over time and have strong 
divergence. During the period 2015-2019, the CSTP1 (Entry Costs) index had the highest 
average score, however, during this period there was a decrease in the average score of CSTP1 
when 2015 reached an average of more than 8 points, by 2019 it will only have more than 7 
points. This may reflect that the time for business registration and removal of difficulties in 
registration procedures has been overcome but is still not consistent with the reality of 
enterprises. For the second-ranked index, Time Cost has remained stable during this period 
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the worst-performing, Policy Bias (CSTP6) and Proactivity of Provincial Leadership (CSTP7), 
there was a clear improvement in this period, with the average score in 2016 of both indexes is 
around more than 5 points, by 2019 both indexes will reach more than 6 points. This may reflect 
that inequality between business sectors has been overcome and fairness has improved. And 
similarly, local leaders have been more flexible in implementing central policies. 
 
Figure 1. The four highest and lowest indicators of the quality of public administration 
 
Figure 2. Rate of profitable businesses in 2015-2019 
Besides, in Table 2 the percentage of profitable enterprises by locality (Pf) has a large 
difference from 34.7% to 97.5%, nearly three times higher between the province with the 
largest percentage of profitable enterprises compared to the province with the smallest rate of 
profitable enterprises (Pf). Figure 2 shows the trend of percentage of profitable enterprises in 
the period 2015-2019. In general, it can be easily seen that the rate of profitable enterprises in 
this period gradually decreased, in which the average rate of profitable enterprises in 2015 was 
about more than 60%. Still, in 2019 the rate only falls around 50%. The percentage of 
enterprises with the highest and lowest profits also fell in 2015. 
Econometric Analysis of Panel Data 
The correlation matrix between the variables is shown in Table 3 below. According to this 
matrix, the correlation coefficient between some explanatory variables is quite high such as 
Land Access and Security of Tenure (CSTP2), Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance 
(CSTP4), Informal Charges (CSTP5), but in general, all coefficients are less than 0.8. 
According to Wooldridge (2010), when performing regression analyses with panel data, 
multicollinearity is not a big problem because the independent variables can be correlated, 





ISSN 2721-0960 (Print), ISSN 2721-0847 (online) 
Copyright © 2021, Journal La Sociale, Under the license CC BY-SA 4.0  






















CSTP 1 1.00          
CSTP 2 -0.33 1.00         
CSTP 3 -0.13 0.30 1.00        
CSTP 4 0.01 0.54 0.20 1.00       
CSTP 5 -0.26 0.69 0.25 0.69 1.00      
CSTP 6 -0.37 0.54 0.19 0.36 0.54 1.00     
CSTP 7 -0.36 0.66 0.48 0.49 0.66 0.53 1.00    
CSTP 8 -0.43 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.24 1.00   
CSTP 9 -0.29 0.04 0.26 -0.11 0.08 -0.09 0.28 0.39 1.00  
CSTP 10 -0.27 0.55 0.32 0.43 0.55 0.54 0.64 0.11 0.10 1.00 
Source: Author’s calculate 
To strengthen the model, the multicollinearity test for the variables shows that the variance 
inflation coefficient VIF of each independent variable is mostly lower than three, and the mean 
of VIF (2.08) is less than 5. (Table 4). This can prove that it is impossible to conclude that the 
model exists multicollinearity and that all variables are independent and can be included in the 
regression model. In addition, for panel data, a serial correlation test is necessary. But this test 
is usually only applicable to long time-series data, and it is not a problem for the study in a 
period of a few years. And in this study, the author uses panel data for 63 provinces over five 
years, so serial correlation is unnecessary for the study. 
Table 4. VIF index of variables 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Toletance R-Squared 
CSTP1 1.63 1.28 0.6123 0.3877 
CSTP2 2.42 1.56 0.4124 0.5876 
CSTP3 1.36 1.17 0.7352 0.2648 
CSTP4 2.30 1.52 0.4340 0.5660 
CSTP5 3.16 1.78 0.3167 0.6833 
CSTP6 1.94 1.39 0.5167 0.4833 
CSTP7 3.13 1.77 0.3200 0.6800 
CSTP8 1.38 1.18 0.7234 0.2766 
CSTP9 1.52 1.23 0.6585 0.3415 
CSTP10 1.94 1.39 0.5166 0.4834 
Mean VIF         2.08 
Source: Author’s calculate 
This paper uses a model to estimate the local rate of profitable enterprises by using panel data 
regression, including three models: Pools OLS, fixed-effects model (FE), and random effects 
model (RE). To choose the most effective model, the author used the Hausman test (Hausman, 
1978) used to choose between the RE model and FE model, in which the hypothesis H0 is that 
the preferred model is random effects versus the alternative the fixed effects if H0 is accepted, 
the RE model is suitable. Vice versa, if H0 is rejected, the FE model is suitable. And Wald test 
to choose between Pool OLS model and FE model, in which the hypothesis H0 assumes that 
the variance between objects or times is constant, then accepts H0 is the Pools OLS model is 
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Results of the experimental choice between model FE and RE indicate that the p-value of 
accreditation Hausman is significant (p-value = 0.0224), which means reject the null hypothesis 
H0 and accept the hypothesis H1, i.e., the FE fixed-effects model is suitable for the study. 
However, one disadvantage of panel data is that with a large number of observations in a short 
time series, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation phenomena often arise. So, after choosing 
the appropriate model as FE, the author uses the Wald test to check the heteroskedasticity of 
the FE model, p-value. = 0.000 < 0.05, inferring to reject the hypothesis H0 of the test, so it is 
concluded that the research data has a variable variance. Next, the Wooldridge test is used to 
check the autocorrelation of the data. The result is p-value = 0.0457 < 0.05, showing that the 
data is present. autocorrelation. From here, we can see that there are defects in the dataset. To 
overcome these two phenomena, the FGLS method is employed to estimate the model. 
Table 6. Results of econometric models for the proportion of profitable enterprises by location 
  (POOL) (FEM) (REM) (GLS) 
CSTP1 0.0447*** 





































-0.00163   
(-0.30)   















































(9.35)   
N 315 315 315 315 
R-sq 0.43 0.434 0.417   
Hausman test 20.82**  
Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation 
32.415***  
Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity 
2990.62***  
Note:  t statistics in parentheses; *** p < 0.01; **p < 0.05;  * p < 0.1 
Source: Author’s calculate 
The results of the FGLS method presented in Table 6 show that, except for four variables 
CSTP2, CSTP4, CSTP5, CSTP7, is not statistically significant; all the remaining six variables 
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the rate of profitable enterprises in each locality if the quality of public administration of each 
locality has some changes. Some indicators have a positive effect, while others have a negative 
impact as follows: 
The Entry Costs (CSTP1) have a positive impact and have the same direction as the rate of 
profitable enterprises in each locality. This coefficient has statistical significance at 1%. 
Accordingly, when the quality of public administration increases by 1%, the rate of profitable 
enterprises in each locality increases by 0.01666%. This implies that the higher the number of 
localities with the market entry points, the faster and more efficient the time and procedures 
for business registration or change are. The lower the costs of entry will help the rate of 
profitable businesses in the locality increase higher. Research results are consistent with 
economic theory when the cost reduction helps increase the enterprise's profit. According to 
(Gaganis et al., 2019), when the market entry cost is high, it will reduce the competition of 
enterprises, which makes the old companies become lazy and operate less efficiently, leading 
to a decrease in corporate profitability. 
The transparency and Access to Information (CSTP3) coefficient has a negative sign and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This means that the transparency variable has a negative 
and opposite effect on the dependent variable. When the transparency index increases by 1%, 
at the same time, the rate of profitable enterprises of each province will decrease by 0.0159%. 
This shows that when provinces have easy access to provincial plans or legal documents 
necessary for business operations, businesses have access to such documents. This version is 
equal to each other. At this time, the rate of profitable enterprises in each locality will decrease. 
When information and policies from central to local are communicated transparently and fairly 
among businesses, this helps to make the business environment more fair and competitive, then 
impact the performance of the business and affect the profitability of the enterprise (Cherchye 
& Verriest, 2016). According to Thi Bich et al. (2009), Bach Ngoc (2017) has argued that 
improving transparency has no significant impact on firm size growth. This may be due to the 
transparency in providing general documentation about the plan or regulation, so the business 
will not benefit much, for the resulting business performance will not have much impact on the 
company's profit. Similar to the research conclusion of Kafouros & Aliyev (2016), the Policy 
Bias (CSTP6) has a positive correlation with the rate of profitable enterprises by locality and 
is statistically significant at the 5% level. Accordingly, when the equal competition score 
increases by 1%, the rate of profitable enterprises in that locality increases by 0.0085%. The 
impact of equal competition on the profitability of enterprises implies that if provincial leaders 
always create a fair competition environment among business entities (SOEs, private 
enterprises, and foreign-invested enterprises) include: administrative procedures - papers, 
access to land, etc., the proportion of profitable businesses in the area will be increased. 
Although the increase rate is not much, it has a great impact on each business entity to improve 
the competitiveness of each business entity. Business Support Services (CSTP8) has a negative 
effect on the rate of profitable businesses at the 5% significance level. In other words, when 
the business support service score increases to 1%, the rate of profitable enterprises by locality 
decreases by 0.0119%. This means that businesses will have a negative impact on profits when 
using these support services locally. This may be because these services are only prioritized in 
terms of appearance rather than focusing on the practicality of services for businesses. In 
addition, to support these services, enterprises may have to pay additional time and financial 
costs (Chu Thi, 2018), which may increase enterprises' costs, leading to negatively affecting 
corporate profits.  
Similarly, the Labor and Training (CSTP9) is negatively related to the percentage of profitable 
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1%, the rate of profitable enterprises in each locality will decrease by 0.4366%. This means 
that efforts by provincial leaders to promote vocational training and skills development to 
support local industries will increase the efficiency of businesses. This is probably due to the 
difference in labor qualifications and the actual needs of the business or the difference in labor 
demand between industries, so most businesses have to train more or re-train them. This causes 
training costs to increase, decreasing profits (Chu Thi, 2018). 
Finally, the index of Legal Institutions (CSTP10) has a positive and positive impact on the rate 
of profitable enterprises with a statistical significance of 10%. Accordingly, when the Legal 
and Security Institutions score increased by 1%, the rate of profitable enterprises by locality 
increased by 0.0082%. It shows us that the trust of private enterprises in the province's court 
system and judicial system is very meaningful. Businesses see these legal institutions as 
effective tools for dispute resolution or as a place where businesses can complain about corrupt 
practices by local public officials. According to the theory of economic institutions, ensuring 
the ownership of enterprises and reducing transaction costs will motivate enterprises to decide 
to invest and develop. Thus, it also improves their performance, which enhances the 
profitability of the business. 
Based on the results obtained from this study, the author makes some recommendations to 
improve the quality of public administration in localities by improving the indicators of public 
administration quality. That can create an effective operating environment for businesses and 
improve the local profit rate. The improvement of public administration quality indicators has 
a number of positive impacts and some negative impacts. For the indicators that positively 
affect the rate of local enterprises, local authorities at all levels should continue to promote and 
improve these indicators. For indicators that have a negative impact, leaders need to absorb 
and record the feedback of organizations, associations, and businesses to better check the 
implementation process. Consists of: Firstly, for market access, in order to maintain and 
improve the score of this indicator, local authorities need to continue to review, amend and 
supplement the laws related to the accession market such as (i) Continue to shorten the waiting 
time for business registration in the local area, especially the post-registration procedures. 
According to Malesky et al. (2018) stated in the 2018 PCI Report that the burden of post-
business registration is still a big problem for many businesses when up to 15.8% of businesses 
have to wait for more than one month to have enough other necessary documents to officially 
operate. Therefore, the post-registration work needs to be further improved, shortening the time 
and simplifying the unnecessary procedures. (ii) Continue to increase the percentage of 
enterprises registering their business online in order to reduce the pressure on the traditional 
business registration system. To be able to improve this index, localities need to integrate and 
apply information technology tools such as: improving the province's administrative website, 
building an easy-to-see and easy-to-use interface, and guiding documents. specific instructions 
when enterprises register online. Second, for transparency and access to information to be able 
to improve this indicator, the central government needs to continue to examine, supplement, 
amend and promulgate laws related to information transparency.  
News and comments in accessing information. In addition, a very interesting issue, according 
to the research of Chu Thi (2018) mentioned is the label of "confidential" documents. It seems 
that at some levels, local authorities are abusing this issue when regulations are not consistent 
with each other. If the local government does not want to make this information public, they 
will automatically label it as "secret." This creates a loophole for some interest groups to take 
advantage of when businesses want to get information. Therefore, State leaders need to have 
consistent regulations in the classification of classified and non-confidential information to 
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capturing relevant information in a timely manner. Third, the fair competition index has a 
positive impact on the rate of profitable enterprises by locality. The creation of an equal 
competitive environment among enterprises helps to improve the internal competitiveness of 
each enterprise. To ensure a level playing field for all businesses to improve competitiveness 
and attract investment, the provincial leadership should direct the promotion of propaganda, 
support, and create favorable conditions for domestic enterprises, access to land, and capital. 
Ensuring that there is no bias between different types of businesses. In particular, the focus is 
on propaganda, especially those who directly handle administrative procedures of enterprises, 
raise awareness, thereby adjusting the sense of responsibility, implementing the guidelines and 
policies of the Party. 
The State on fair support for businesses to establish a fair competition environment. Local 
leaders need to propose to the government, officials, and central branches to continue reviewing 
and removing inappropriate incentives for state-owned enterprises. Continue to amend and 
supplement relevant legal provisions to ensure fairness for all business sectors. Fourth, for 
business support services, local authorities continue to improve. Attention should be paid to 
providing information to businesses by publicly listing on the provincial portal and the websites 
of departments, branches, and localities. At the same time, it is necessary to improve trade 
promotion activities by maintaining and developing the efficiency of the provincial e-
commerce trading floor. It is also necessary to organize quality trade fairs to promote and 
support businesses in consuming local products.  
In addition, provincial leaders also need to pay more attention to small and medium-sized 
enterprises because this group is facing many difficulties in accessing land and credit. Fifth, in 
order to improve the local labor training quality index, the locality needs to review and advise 
on perfecting mechanisms and policies on vocational training in the direction of standardization, 
in line with current standards. internationalization and reintegration. Regularly monitor and 
evaluate changes and requirements of the labor market to promptly adjust job creation and 
vocational education to be compatible with the context of the fourth industrial revolution. In 
addition, businesses also need to actively coordinate with local vocational education centers to 
exchange requirements for job skills compatible with businesses and place orders with 
education centers, to reduce the cost of retraining for employees. Finally, in terms of legal 
institutions and security and order, localities need to continue maintaining and promoting their 
achievements. Locality needs to improve the quality of the court system, in which the judicial 
system must show its preeminence as a place where businesses believe in the ability of the law 
to protect copyright or enforcement. contract; need propaganda to encourage businesses to be 
willing to go to court to resolve disputes; eliminate the situation of informal expenses in the 
process of settling disputes and settling cases, demonstrating fairness and rigor in the 
adjudication process, and ensuring that courts at all levels handle economic cases quickly. 
quickly and the judgment is enforced. In addition, legal procedures and regulations should be 
clear in terms of time to resolve the case, ensuring promptness, fairness, and reasonableness. 
Conclusion  
This study examines the impact of public administration quality components on the percentage 
of profitable enterprises in Vietnam in the period 2015 - 2019. Research results have also shown 
that administrative quality Local public administration will have a certain influence on the 
profits of businesses in the area, and it shows the percentage of profitable businesses in the 
locality. This study is quite consistent with the theoretical and experimental studies of scholars 
worldwide that have confirmed that the quality of public administration plays an important role 
in the development of prosperity of the economy in general and individual business results. 
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impact the rate of profitable enterprises in each locality, having both positive and negative 
effects. In general, the effects also reflect the degree of influence of the quality of public 
administration on the company's profitability. The indicators of Entry Costs, Policy Bias, and 
Labor and Training have a high significance to the rate of profitable enterprises in each locality. 
In addition, the study also makes several recommendations for both local governments and 
businesses to improve and enhance the quality of public administration in each locality to create 
a healthy business environment that gives fairness to all businesses. These topics can attract 
investment and improve business performance, contributing to the stability and growth of the 
local economy in particular and the growth of the country in general. 
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